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Abstract
In the Southeast Asian Archipelago, those of Chinese origin (referred to 
as “ethnic Chinese” in this chapter) have long engaged in trading with, 
and settled in, coastal areas including Java. As the developments of mines 
and plantations proceeded under colonial rule in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, more ethnic Chinese immigrated mainly to the Outer Islands (islands 
other than Java and Madura). Though fully settled for generations in these 
regions, they were regarded as “Foreign Orientals” under Dutch rule and 
were legally distinguished from “natives” such as the Javanese and the Ba-
linese. This boundary also functioned actively in terms of occupation and 
social life. In the early twentieth-century Indonesia, it was “natives” that 
were at the center of the nationalist movement, wherein the ethnic Chi-
nese would be regarded as “the inner Other”. These historical situations 
forced the ethnic Chinese to be much more conscious than other ethnic 
groups of where they should situate themselves in the new nation-state.
In the mid-1960s, the Soeharto regime started under the structure of 
the Cold-War. Giving the highest priority to the maintenance of domestic 
stability and economic development, the regime actively mobilized the 
economic resources of the ethnic Chinese while separating them from 
mainland China, and thoroughly suppressing “Chineseness” in order to 
avoid provoking native anti-ethnic Chinese sentiment. Under this so-called 
“Assimilation Policy”, it became extremely difficult for ethnic Chinese to 
transmit their culture and language inter-generationally. Meanwhile, they 
continued to be segregated as ethnic Chinese socio-politically, which para-
doxically served to fix their ethnic identity.
The Soeharto regime fell in 1998, and the ethnic Chinese were freed 
from this suppression. Unlike the Javanese and the Balinese, the ethnic 
Chinese spread in urban areas across the country, and do not have regions 
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they call a homeland in Indonesia. Also, they have been labeled as “the 
Other” or “the foreigner” throughout modern history, and experienced a 
“cultural blank” over thirty years. Now that the ethnic Chinese, who occu-
py a unique position in this country, can express their own culture freely, 
what and how do they try to express it?
In this chapter, the author explores two contrasting cases in Lasem 
(Central Java) and Singkawang (West Kalimantan), where “Chinese ele-
ments” are being painted in different ways onto the batiks, the tradition-
al wax-resist dyed fabric deemed the “essence of Indonesian culture”. 
Though this chapter doesn’t address the theme of Islam directly, the con-
crete ongoing cases and arguments pertaining to the cultural representa-
tion of the ethnic minority raised within it serve as a useful reference in 
understanding the cultural diversity in this area.
Key words:  The ethnic Chinese, Indonesia, batik, cultural expression
1 Introduction
1.1 The Growing Interest in Batik
In October 2009, “batik (Javanese wax painting)” was recognized by UNESCO as 
an Intangible Cultural Heritage for being a uniquely Indonesian cultural symbol 
drawing from a rich philosophical heritage. Then-President Yudoyono called 
upon all Indonesians to wear batiks in celebration of UNESCO’s recognition. A 
new tradition of wearing a batik shirt every Friday has since been setting in, par-
ticularly amongst public sector employees.
This was the third Indonesian intangible cultural heritage item to be add-
ed to UNESCO’s list, following “wayang kulit (shadow puppet theatre)” and 
“kris (traditional dagger)”. Wayang kulit and kris which had earlier international 
recognition, are so-called “traditional arts” or “traditional crafts”, and for many 
Indonesians are somewhat distant from their everyday lives. In contrast batik, or 
batik-like creations, are an intimate part of everyday life in Indonesia, being uti-
lized and consumed in a wide variety of ways. UNESCO’s website explains their 
decision: 
“The techniques, symbolism and culture surrounding hand-dyed cot-
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ton and silk garments known as Indonesian Batik permeate the lives of Indo-
nesians from beginning to end: infants are carried in batik slings decorated 
with symbols designed to bring the child luck, and the dead are shrouded in 
funerary batik1.”
It is well-known that the intricate designs of batik are drawn with wax before 
immersion in dye. The wax is washed off before drawing the next design with 
wax and immersing it in a different color dye. These steps are repeated until the 
multicolored patterns of batik are born, in a dizzying manual process. That batik, 
having a major base in Indonesia and particularly in Java, has been closely inter-
twined with the culture of the region is undeniable. Notably in the inland region 
of Java, batik fused with the court culture while developing into a distinct symbol-
ic system. In the history of the northern coastal region of Java, influences from 
Arabia, Persia, China, Europe, and Japan were robustly incorporated into batik, 
with motifs and styles freely being chosen in its development.
The emergence of batik as commercial enterprise, however, is relatively new, 
not beginning until the mid-nineteenth century. Popularization of batik among 
those with no connections with the aristocracy or with wealth is said to have com-
menced sometime around the turn of the twentieth century (Sekimoto 2000: 
270; 2003: 466–468). Subsequently, throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, substantial growth in production and cost reduction was achieved by the 
use of chemical dyes and through introducing a copper stamp called “cap”. Inno-
vation of this nature which could even be termed capitalistic in essence, played 
a major role in batik being embraced by the general Indonesian population to 
the extent that it is today described as a “tradition” (Sekimoto 1995: 42). A sim-
ilar process achieved distribution of this textile beyond the regional confines of 
Java, to encompass the Indonesian archipelago. By the 1970s, the so-called “batik 
print ”, mass-produced in factories, was being sold throughout the country. It has 
been argued that it was the emergence of these batik-like materials, mass-pro-
duced much more cheaply than cloth produced through the wax-resist dying 
technique, that put true ownership of batik in the hands of the Indonesian mass-
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es (Sekimoto 2000: 270–271).
The above-described recent history of batik is today disguised by the term 
“tradition”, and batik has come to be perceived, from within as well as without 
the country, as a representation of the pure and authentic “essence of Indone-
sian culture”2. UNESCO’s recognition of batik as an Intangible Cultural Heritage 
mentioned earlier is symbolic of this view, and has served to promote it.
Amidst this widespread attention on batik, I chanced to encounter expres-
sions of “Chineseness” on batik fabric in two separate regions in Indonesia. One 
was in Lasem in Central Java Province where, as a personal experiment of a batik 
producer, a line from Chinese poetry was depicted in Chinese characters on ba-
tik, and the other was in Singkawang in West Kalimantan Province where motifs 
such as bamboo and fans were introduced into batik design under the novel con-
cept of “Tidayu” on the initiative of the municipal government. As is explained 
later in detail, the two cases are in contrast with each other in their settings: The 
former case was seen in one of the well-known batik producing-centers where 
ethnic Chinese have historically played a prominent role, whereas the latter case 
was observed in a city with a large ethnic Chinese population, though there hav-
ing no notable history of batik production.
Of course “Chinese identity” or “Chineseness” can be expressed in many 
different ways, and need not be restricted to textile design (Tsuda 2011: Part 4; 
2012a). However, by examining concretely the meaning of “Chineseness” being 
expressed on batik, or the “essence of Indonesian culture”, and by asking what 
exactly that “Chineseness” means in both cases, we are granted insight into sev-
eral characteristics of the self-positioning of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and 
their cultural representation.
1.2  The Intriguing Relationship between Batik and the Ethnic Chinese
The first historical fact requiring mention in discussing the relationship between 
batik and the ethnic Chinese is the founding of the Islamic Trade Association 
(Sarekat Dagang Islam) in 1910, sponsored by leading batik vendors in Surakarta. 
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At the turn of the twentieth century, the batik business in central Java was one 
of the few sectors not dominated by the ethnic Chinese. However, against the 
backdrop of the technological innovation described above, increasing numbers 
of ethnic Chinese vendors were moving into this sector. The Islamic Trade As-
sociation called for unity amongst “natives” in the name of their common faith, 
Islam, in order to compete with ethnic Chinese competitors who were rapidly 
expanding their influence. This development is of great interest in that in these 
early stages of first picturing and then realizing “Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian 
Nation)”, an entity which had never existed before, the ethnic Chinese were be-
ing designated as the “Other” and that the batik business became a central focus 
as an object to protect from that “Other”; this seems to foreshadow both how the 
ethnic Chinese would later be singled out as the “Chinese problem” of national 
unity, and how batik would become an important component of the Indonesian 
cultural identity.
However, it is impossible to ignore the critical role that ethnic Chinese capi-
tal played in the process of batik being launched into its trajectory as an industry, 
as described earlier. We must not forget also that batik in Java’s northern coast 
— Lasem batik, which will be studied in this chapter, is distinctly representative 
of north coast Javanese batik — has been refined and nurtured by the hands of 
ethnic Chinese.
Batik which today is viewed as an embodiment of “the essence of Indonesian 
culture”, has thus maintained an intriguing relationship with the ethnic Chinese; 
a relationship which has been close yet convoluted. In view of such a history, 
what is the meaning of the attempts in the present post-Soeharto era, to incor-
porate “Chineseness” into batik? To answer this question, we must first obtain an 
overview of how the ethnic Chinese have been generally positioned in Indone-
sia’s modern history, particularly during the Soeharto era and the years directly 
preceding and following it.
In the next section, I will outline the issues concerning the peculiar social 
position the ethnic Chinese have been placed in Indonesia. I will take particular 
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note of the changes in the names used to identify the group, which is closely 
connected with the etching out of their identity. Following this general overview, 
then in Sections 3 and 4, based on my own observations in the field and gained 
through interviews, I will describe the current situation in two geographical ar-
eas, Lasem and Singkawang. Finally, in Section 5, I will further analyze the two 
case studies, which will illuminate several characteristics of the modes of cultural 
representation of the ethnic Chinese in the post-Soeharto era.
2  The Ethnic Chinese and their Cultural Positioning
2.1  From “Cina” to “Tionghoa”: The Years of Nationalism
Throughout the twentieth century, the ethnic Chinese were tossed about by 
the ebb and flow of history and politics, which is symbolized by changes in the 
names used to identify them in local languages.
Prior to the nineteenth century, the term widely used in the Archipelago 
including the Dutch East Indies to describe China and the ethnic Chinese is said 
to have been “Cina”, a Malay (Melayu) word (Coppel and Suryadinata 1970). 
This word, which is thought to have its origin in the name of an ancient Chinese 
Dynasty, still lives on today in several local languages, such as the “Cèna” in Mad-
urese, and “Cina (Cino)” in Javanese.
However, starting at the end of the nineteenth century and going into the 
twentieth, a consciousness swelled amongst the ethnic Chinese in response to 
the eruption of Chinese Nationalism in Mainland China during the same peri-
od. This was a result of the structural change encompassing East Indian Chinese 
society, and a multitude of other factors complexly intertwined (Shiraishi 1997: 
190). This tide of consciousness would later find an outlet in more concrete ex-
pressions such as a movement advocating education to promote becoming “pure 
Chinese”, and a movement aiming to instill “Chineseness” through religion. It 
was in the process of these events that the words “Tiongkok” and “Tionghoa”, the 
Hokkien reading of the words “ 中国（China）” and “ 中華（Chinese）” began 
to appear in places such as Malay language newspapers with primarily Chinese 
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readership3. In the context of the impassioned discourse about “Our rightful 
place in society” and “Our unadulterated culture”, the words “Tiongkok” and 
“Tionghoa” were endowed with a mission to carry the pride of the ethnic Chinese, 
as well as their hope that one day they would be fairly recognized. Even more 
than the word “Tenglang（唐人）” which had been used widely by the Southeast 
Asian Chinese until then, these new words expressed a sense of renewed awaken-
ing and oneness as a people.
“Tiongkok” and “Tionghoa” became a self-description reflecting self-respect 
and a sense of belonging that they were now a part of a something larger than 
anything they ever knew before. The words gradually gained social acceptance in 
mainstream society, and in turn from around the 1920s the word “Cina” began 
to be perceived as possessing a negative connotation (Coppel and Suryadinata 
1970).
2.2  From “Tionghoa” to “Cina”: Amidst the “Assimilation Policy”
When Indonesia achieved independence, the ethnic Chinese were forced to 
make a difficult decision. They were faced with the question as to how they were 
going to join the mission of raising up the newly born nation with the rest of the 
“Indonesian Nation”. This went beyond simply choosing citizenship, or decid-
ing whether to be Chinese, Taiwanese, or Indonesian. They were being asked 
to choose between resolutely maintaining their “Chineseness”, or to give it up 
voluntarily. This starkly contrasts the Javanese and Balinese experience, for ex-
ample, where people who had been collectively referred to as “natives” under 
colonial rule, had been simultaneously and nearly automatically positioned as 
“Bangsa Indonesia asli (trueborn Indonesians)” (Tsuda 2011: 258).
In the backdrop of this difference is a fact mentioned earlier, that in the 
unfolding of Indonesian nationalism, the “indigenous people” were envisaged as 
“Us” in a manner conforming to the colonial classification, and the ethnic Chi-
nese were deemed to be an important “Other” within that construct.
Also, unlike the Javanese for instance, who were associated with the central 
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and eastern parts of Java, or the Balinese, who were associated with Bali, each po-
sitioned as an ethnic group (suku) representing a given area, the ethnic Chinese, 
though having a presence across the country in urban areas, had no territory 
that spanned a sizable area which they could claim as their own. It can be argued 
that this too is partly why the affirmation of “Chineseness” is not easily accepted 
as a “part (suku) of Indonesia”.
Another factor which is more intimately felt in everyday life, is the issue of 
economic disparity. As a consequence of an economic structure dating back to 
the colonial era, the ethnic Chinese have been generally perceived as wealthy 
merchants; in the context of uproarious calls for “Indonesianization of the econ-
omy”, they were described as outsiders leeching off the “Indonesian Nation”.
Such was the background of the debate during the early 1960s in which two 
sides engaged in debate on whether “Chineseness” should be relinquished or 
resolutely maintained, standing for “assimilation (asimilasi)” and “integration 
(integrasi)” respectively. Those advocating “assimilation” in this context were 
purporting that the ethnic Chinese should voluntarily abandon their “Chinese-
ness” without a trace, blending in completely with their local communities. 
Proponents of “integration” on the other hand argued that the ethnic Chinese 
should maintain their distinctness and identity, and become a new constituent 
of the Indonesian Nation — a suku — just as the Javanese and the Balinese had. 
This debate which unfurled in the pages of the Indonesian language magazine 
Star Weekly is noteworthy as an event in which Chinese Indonesian intellectuals 
proactively debated what their own positioning should be. Tragically, this debate 
between the two sides would later be politicized to an extreme degree over be-
ing pro or anti-communist amidst the political environment of the last days of 
the Sukarno administration. In 1965, triggered by the 30 September Movement, 
the latter “integration” faction would be completely eradicated alongside the 
Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) which had been hailed as the largest in the 
non-communist world (Sadayoshi 1996).
Soeharto, who rose to prominence in the process of quelling this incident, 
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eventually put the National Armed Forces under his power, and as the second 
President, would construct the “New Order (Orde Baru)”, a regime which subse-
quently prevailed for more than thirty years. The most important and pertinent 
challenge for him was to bring security and order back to the nation which was 
in a state of utter chaos. With respect to the ethnic Chinese, his most urgent 
task above all else was to eliminate the intervening influence of the Communist 
Party of China which had been publicly criticizing Soeharto in support of the 
Communist Party of Indonesia, and also to put the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia 
under intense surveillance so as to prevent their becoming the “fifth column of 
the Communist Party of China”. At the same time, increasing anti-Chinese senti-
ment among the so-called Pribumi citizens had to be kept from flaring up amidst 
images of “China - PKI - 30 September Movement - Destruction of order” (Takaki 
1991: 344–347).
Prior to full-fledged initiatives to hammer out policies addressing these 
issues, a symbolic decision was made in 1966 at a convention of army officials. 
This decision ruled that “Tiongkok” and “Tionghoa” which had been in the pro-
cess of becoming accepted widely as words identifying “China” and “Chinese” 
respectively, were to be replaced with the single term “Cina” in all instances from 
that point on. This decision to designedly bring back the word “Cina”, which at 
the time had begun to be perceived to have a derogatory connotation, and to re-
quire its use publicly, was an exercise intending to trigger a psychological impact 
on both the ethnic Chinese and the Pribumi4.
Hence the Soeharto administration would employ the “Assimilation Policy” 
in engaging with the ethnic Chinese, who were now once again subjected to be-
ing called “Cina”. However, the term “assimilation” was no longer being used in 
the same way the pro “assimilation” faction who had won the earlier political bat-
tle had advocated: upholding as an ideal the idea that the ethnic Chinese should 
voluntarily relinquish “Chineseness” in order to make themselves acceptable as 
“proper Indonesians”. The term had now been appropriated by the Soeharto 
administration to mean something entirely different. The various measures sub-
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sequently laid out in succession, on the one hand suppressing any salient expres-
sion of “Chineseness”, while on the other hand designating “Cina” as a target for 
control and surveillance, and yet still mobilizing them for economic purposes 
as needed, were in concordance with the government’s agenda (Tsuda 2011: 
13–14).
Representative examples of policies suppressing “Chineseness” included 
closing Chinese schools, banning the display of any cultural elements associated 
with China or the Chinese, restrictions on Chinese-language newspapers, publi-
cations and printed matter, and encouraging changing Chinese-sounding names 
to ones that sounded more Indonesian (Winarta 2008). Around the early 1980s, 
the policies expanded into the domains of religion, with various regulations 
being imposed on Chinese temples, and official recognition of the Teaching of 
Confucius (Confucianism) being withdrawn (Tsuda 2011: 69–72).
Even though official “assimilation” of the ethnic Chinese into Indonesian 
society was being trumpeted, at sites performing resident registration, the num-
ber of “Cina” citizens continued to be counted separately, one by one in accor-
dance with centralized administrative criteria5. Furthermore, those who were 
identified in such a manner to be “Cina” were discriminated against time and 
again when going through bureaucratic procedures at public offices. In their 
everyday activities as well, they were kept under surveillance by the lowest tiers 
of the executive branch backed by the Ministry of Domestic Affairs, the military, 
and the police. In such ways, the policies imposed on the ethnic Chinese during 
the Soeharto era, at least from the point of view of the ethnic Chinese being reg-
ulated, functioned as forces that locked in and internalized a negative identity: 
they continued to be relentlessly labeled as “Cina” even after erasing their “Chi-
neseness” completely. They could not escape the constant reminders of this 
negative sense of self as a “Cina”. Reminders aimed at them not only through 
government policies but also socially, for example being targeted every time a 
riot erupted triggered by factors such as political instability (Tsuda 2011: Part 3).
There is another important aspect which must be pointed out when consid-
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ering the identity of the ethnic Chinese during the Soeharto era. It is that an ob-
jectification of “Chineseness” was propelled by regulations and systems — such 
as those restricting Chinese characters, Chinese names, Chinese temples and the 
religious practices pertaining to it — turning “Chineseness”, regarded as a thing 
that compelled erasure, into tangible elements. This phenomena which could be 
described as the “packaging of culture”, was not an occurrence uniquely pertain-
ing to the ethnic Chinese; this development extended widely across other ethnic 
groups as well, in the context of the cultivation of a “national culture” (Yamashita 
1998). However, whereas the “suku cultures” in localities such as Java and Bali 
were recasted as exceptional “regional cultures” open to all Indonesian people 
— and subsequent to undergoing packaging — would be met with enthusiastic 
encouragement and cultivation by the state, anything associated with the ethnic 
Chinese was subject to being eliminated or suppressed as an “alien cultural sys-
tem (tata budaya asing)” not suitable for “Indonesia’s individuality (kepribadian 
Indonesia)” (Tsuda 2011: 71).
The sociologist Ariel Heryanto accurately points out that the objective of 
the Soeharto regime in advocating the “Assimilation Policy” was not the com-
plete elimination of an ethnic Chinese identity, but rather to continuously repro-
duce “Chineseness” under careful watch while simultaneously keeping it “under 
erasure”6 (Heryanto 1998: 104). By being tagged throughout the Soeharto era, 
the ethnic Chinese had now been assigned a negative value termed “Cina” and 
their objectified “Chineseness” became evermore conciously noted and conspic-
uous in the informal day-to-day lives.
2.3  From “Cina” to “Tionghoa”: Change in the Post-Soeharto Period
In 1997 the impact of the Asian financial crisis originating in Thailand swallowed 
Indonesia whole and shook the foundation of the Soeharto regime which had 
always exhibited its achievements of advancing stability and development for the 
nation as its self-justification. During this period, there were frequent outbreaks 
of violence targeting the ethnic Chinese, and this trend came to a devastating 
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climax in May 1998 in Jakarta. Riots which would be remembered as the “May 
Tragedy (Tragedi Mei)” were triggered when shots were fired at student protes-
tors demanding government reform. Riots quickly spread to a massive scale, and 
once again a large number of the ethnic Chinese were targeted in lootings and 
rapes. Unable to reverse the state of chaos which had spread across the nation in 
the political, economic and social domains, Soeharto announced his resignation 
at the end of the month, and with that the New Order was finally brought to an 
end.
The administrations subsequently taking over would feel the intense heat 
of the masses, hungry for “reformation” and “democratization” and demanding 
answers on what was going to be done in regard to the policies and systems re-
sponsible for bolstering authoritarian politics. Progress, though gradual, would 
also be made in revising policies discriminating against the ethinc Chinese, in 
response to strong domestic and international condemnation (Winarta 2008). 
This condemnation was generated by human rights concerns, heightened subse-
quent to the May Tragedy, but also driven by the hope to bring back the Chinese 
capital which had escaped out of the country following the May 1998 riots.
With this new atmosphere of openness in the air, a development emerged 
from within the ethnic Chinese community. Up until then they had been denied 
any possibility of self-expression in public spheres, and had been assigned with a 
negative value indifferent to their will, but now there was momentum for them 
to try to come out with vigrous expression of their own political and cultural 
views. It was also during this process that a development was generated to bring 
back the term “Tionghoa” to replace “Cina”, which had been considered derrog-
atory since the early twentieth century and embedded with a negative image 
by being used officially throughout the Soeharto era. However, so far there has 
been no unified movement carried out to address the issue of what the ethnic 
Chinese should be called. It is also true that there are a substantial number of 
the ethnic Chinese for whom the term “Cina”, already integrated as a part of 
their everyday vocabulary, does not invoke such a strong sentiment. This is a ten-
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dency seen particularly among the younger generation who never experienced 
the period when their community was being referred to as “Tionghoa” (Wibowo 
2008: xii). However, in the current post-Soeharto period, official communica-
tions including the media generally choose the terms “Tiongkok” and “Tionghoa” 
to connote respect for the points of view of China and the ethnic Chinese. Also, 
the English terms “China” and “Chinese” are beginning to be used widely for 
their neutral connotation.
As symbolized by this (re-)change of the term used to describe the ethnic 
Chinese, a result of a major change in the social landscape that occurred as the 
nation entered the twenty-first century, in Indonesia today a feeling is taking 
hold around the nation that anybody is relatively free to enjoy “Chinese culture” 
and “Chineseness”, which for a long time was banned from being openly exhib-
ited in public. What is to note is that those expression and acceptance of “Chi-
neseness” cannot necessarily be analyzed in a simple schema that assumes what 
is now being expressed openly following the regime change is the same “ethnic 
Chinese identity” that had been repressed and locked away during the Soeharto 
regime. That is to say, in some spheres “Chineseness” is being newly discovered 
and expressed in new ways with an expanded border of acceptance.
The length of this chapter would not allow for a full description of all the 
developments involving “Chineseness” which are now occurring in the post-Soe-
harto period. Therefore, in the following sections I will introduce undertakings 
in two separate locations — one in the town of Lasem, Central Java, and the oth-
er in the community of Singkawang, West Kalimantan — each of which plausibly 
suggests a rediscovery of this “Chineseness” emerging today, its expression, and a 
new current of its acceptance. These two cases are both unique occurrences, and 
are phenomena being generated within a scope limited to a narrow medium of 
expression, that is, on the surface of batiks. However, when considering both the 
history of the last century in relation to the positioning of batik as the “essence 
of Indonesian culture” examined in the previous section, and the positioning of 
“Chineseness” reviewed generally in this section as signified by changes of the 
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name used to describe the ethnic Chinese, the following two cases will symboli-
cally reveal glimpses of the dynamism that exists in the cultural representation of 
“Chineseness” in post-Soeharto Indonesia.
3   “The World’s Only” Batik with Chinese Characters: A Case 
Study in Lasem
3.1  Lasem Batik
Lasem is a small fishing town facing the Java Sea, in Rembang Regency which is 
situated in the northeast corner of the Central Java Province. The North Coast 
Road connecting Semarang, the capital of Central Java, and Surabaya, the capi-
tal of East Java, runs through the center of this town, which once flourished as a 
shipbuilding center, using teak wood produced inland. Today the town is a bus-
tling hub of overland transport. This area is known for having seen settlement 
by ethnic Chinese since a relatively early time in history. As is apparent in the 
old-fashioned but stately Chinese style architecture which still today remains in 
large numbers, Lasem has developed as a “town of the ethnic Chinese”7.
Another aspect of the town of Lasem which cannot go unmentioned is the 
batik industry. Batik in this town shares the distinguishing feature of batik pro-
duced in other areas along the northern coastline of Java: graphic patterns and 
vibrant colors. Synonymous with Lasem Batik is “chicken blood red (abang getih 
pithik)”, a dye the batik in this town is particularly well-known for, which is said 
to have been handed down as a secret formula. Lasem Batik is also known for 
being dyed for the most part in production studios managed by ethnic Chinese 
owners, and as indicated by motifs such as the phoenix, quilin, dragon, butterfly, 
and foliage scrolls corresponding to occasions, is deeply influenced by Chinese 
culture8. Lasem Batik has been known as “batik of the ethnic Chinese”.
During the period of Japanese military rule and the subsequent Indonesian 
National Revolution leading to the nation’s independence, batik production in 
the town temporarily dwindled due to lack of supplies and uncertainty during 
volatile times. Production volume was thereafter recovered by targeting non-eth-
239
Batiks dyed with “Chineseness”
nic Chinese as primary buyers. However, from around 1970, with the distribution 
of batik-like printed material expanding in scope nationally, in addition to the 
added factor of a lack of successors, batik in this town was beginning to turn into 
a sunset industry.
3.2  Njoo Tjoen Hian’s “New Creation”
It was exactly around this time that Mr. Njoo Tjoen Hian (楊俊賢 / Sigit Witjak-
sono), born in Lasem in 1929, took over his father’s batik production studio at 
age forty. Married to a Javanese wife, Mr. Njoo is proud of being an example of a 
“mixed marriage (pembauran)”. Initially he left most of the work of managing the 
production studio to his wife — which is not at all unusual in the batik business 
— and was engaged in the operation of a separate agency business during the 
day. In 1994, he left the agency job following an ownership change, and began 
to spend much of his time on batik production at home.
Impacted by the Asian financial crisis in 1997, his peers in the batik business 
closed production studios one after another (Kwan et al. 2010: 40). However, Mr. 
Njoo and his wife, whose three daughters had already grown up and left home, 
had the freedom to continue batik production even with a marginal level of busi-
ness. It was around this time that Mr. Njoo, who had become a prominent figure 
in the community and a board member at the local Chinese temples as well as 
at a private elementary school, began to accept frequent interview requests from 
the media, both as the face of the batik business which now had very few left in 
the area to represent it and had become a “traditional industry”, and a respected 
elder with great knowledge of the local “ethnic Chinese culture”.
In the beginning of 2009, Mr. Njoo having turned age eighty started a cer-
tain experiment: One which entailed merging verses of poetry written in Chi-
nese characters into batik designs9.
As described earlier, Lasem Batik has historically been known for having 
been developed by ethnic Chinese producers, and having had ample Chinese el-
ements incorporated into its designs. There was a time when it was not unusual 
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for images of the dragon, the lion, Hok Lok Siou (福禄寿) or Delapan Dewa (八仙) 
to be dyed into batik for use as decorative cloths (Tok-Wi) to drape over altars en-
shrining deities or ancestors. Fabrics ordered for such religious purposes would 
often be additionally decorated with Chinese characters representing the names 
of the temple or the deities, or characters such as “福 ” which stands for fortune. 
However, such Chinese-influenced designs later became very rare, due to cus-
tomer demographics shifting away from the ethnic Chinese towards the so-called 
Pribumi (Kwan et al. 2010: 39), and also because the religious tendencies of the 
ethnic Chinese had undergone change as oppression of ethnic Chinese culture 
as a whole intensified. In addition, Chinese schools had been shut down by na-
tional policy since the latter half of the 1960s, which meant that most adults in 
the prime of their working years or younger had no Chinese language proficien-
cy or knowledge of Chinese characters (cf. Tsuda 2012a: 193–194).
In this context Mr. Njoo’s experiment of bringing in phrases written in Chi-
nese characters — he had at one point been taught Chinese characters during 
his school years — as the primary component of the design is, according to him, 
a completely “new creation (kreasi baru)”, and he proudly shared with me, “This 
Photograph 1
 Mr. Njoo wearing his batik with Chinese characters, and his wife.
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is the world’s only batik with Chinese characters, you won’t find this anywhere 
else”10.
The actual process is comprised of the following steps. First he draws axis 
lines using a pencil and ruler, to serve as a guide in positioning the designs on 
the white cotton fabric. Then he writes characters such as “四海之内 皆兄弟也 
(Within the four seas all men are brothers)” with a pencil. After that, Javanese 
craftswomen who work in the production studio trace the designs with wax, as in 
normal batik producing procedures, and fill the spaces with intricate patterns in 
the image of traditional Javanese “World Flowers (Sekar Jagad)”, drawn freehand. 
The process of saturating this fabric in dye then washing off the wax is repeated 
a couple of times, and a vibrantly colorful batik is born.
This “new creation” began when Mr. Njoo made a batik incorporating 
phrases representing Confucius’s teachings such as “忠恕 (conscientiousness and 
altruism)” to use as material for his own shirt11. When the shirt was complete 
he wore it for the first time to a festival at a Chinese temple out of town. People 
walking by asked him, “Where did you buy that?”, and it generated so much at-
tention that orders were placed on the spot upon hearing his response.
Photograph 2
The cotton fabric with Mr. Njoo’s penciled-in designs.
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According to Mr. Njoo, this batik with Chinese characters was something 
which in the beginning he had decided to try as a small personal experiment 
just to see what it would look like, without commercial purposes in mind. This is 
because batik to him was — even though at this point UNESCO’s decision to reg-
ister it as an intangible cultural heritage had not occurred yet — without a doubt 
the “essence of Indonesian culture”. Furthermore, he was proud of the fact that 
he had always remained loyal to preserving “Lasem’s tradition”, which was hand-
ed down from his father along with the dyes and production processes. He ex-
plained to me that he therefore felt a certain degree of hesitation about fusing 
new “Chinese elements” with “Indonesian culture” or with “Lasem’s tradition”, 
both from ethical (segi etika) and an aesthetic (segi estetika) standpoints.
Then one day members of the royal court of Yogyakarta visited Rembang 
to partake in an official event12. After the event, the group requested to observe 
the current state of Lasem Batik. In a quick turn of events it was decided that 
the Regent, who was the host, would show them the production studio of Mr. 
Njoo, who is known as a respected elder knowledgeable about the state of batik 
in Lasem. When receiving the Regent and the royal family, Mr. Njoo intentional-
Photograph 3
Craftswomen in the production studio drawing on the wax.
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ly wore the batik shirt with Chinese characters mentioned earlier, and provided 
them with a lecture on the general history of the batik industry in Lasem and the 
production process. “By the way,” he added at the end, before explaining that 
he recently came up with a design incorporating Chinese characters, indicating 
to his shirt. Then to find out what they thought he asked them, “Is creating this 
kind of design not destructive to our culture (merusak budaya)?” They respond-
ed, “To the contrary, it is interesting and great (menarik, malah bagus)” showing 
enthusiasm for the shirt, and that is when he decided to start the production of 
batik with Chinese characters in earnest.
However as described earlier, with most of the ethnic Chinese, including 
those in the areas surrounding Lasem, not being able to read Chinese charac-
ters, there seemed to be little prospect that such a product would sell in large 
volumes. Therefore he initially started out by creating only quantities for which 
orders were placed. Word-of-mouth spread quickly and soon orders were coming 
in from out of town as well.
Interestingly enough, this batik with Chinese characters grew to be distrib-
uted and consumed beyond the ethnic Chinese customer base which he had at 
first expected the buyers to solely consist of. When I visited Mr. Njoo’s produc-
tion studio in early 2010, I saw batiks with vibrant red and indigo Chinese char-
acters, which had been ordered by a national elementary school for its teachers’ 
uniforms, swaying in the wind on the drying pole. Dyed on the batik were a few 
different four letter couplets from the “Analects (論語)”, chosen by Mr. Njoo.
“This is Confucius’s teaching, but carries a universal and wonderful 
message. That’s why the other day I got an order from a Haji 13, and it just 
sells so well (laku keras) that my hands are almost full just processing the 
orders. But they won’t be able to understand the meanings on their own, so 
see, I give it to them like this, with the translation.”
Telling me that, he opened up a plastic bag with a batik awaiting delivery 
in it, taking out from inside a slender slip of paper containing the handwritten 
translation of the poetry verse.
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3.3  The Restating of “Chineseness” and its Acceptance
As stated already, Lasem Batik has for a long time been well-known as the “batik 
of the ethnic Chinese”. The batik industry in Lasem fell into a period of stag-
nation, exactly around the half-way point of the Soeharto era when oppression 
against the ethnic Chinese was fully institutionalized. However this was not so 
much owing to the fact that the batik in this region was the “batik of the ethnic 
Chinese”, as it was due to Lasem sharing similar circumstances with other region-
al batik production centers which were also struggling. The common problem 
batik-producers in both Lasem and other areas were facing was the emergence 
of “batik print ” in the latter half of the twentieth century. Failing to adapt to this 
change, they were being forced to close or scale down their operations (Sekimoto 
2000: 274). Entering the 2000s, the Rembang Regency government began taking 
on various activities to support Lasem Batik, such as organizing exhibitions as 
part of its industrial and tourism promotion initiatives. At these events, the fact 
that Lasem Batik is not only an “authentic hand-drawn batik (batik tulis asli)”, but 
Photograph 4
The dyed poetry verses.
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also a fusion between “ethnic Chinese culture (budaya Tionghoa)” and the “culture 
of Java’s north coast (budaya Pesisir Utara Jawa)” is actively promoted as a positive 
value.
Taking place in such a context, Mr. Njoo’s “new creation” could be charac-
terized as layering a further pronouncement of “Chineseness” onto that which 
already existed, and is already known to be “relating to ethnic Chinese”. In other 
words, the “new creation” is one which draws the “fruits of mixture between the 
ethnic Chinese and the Javanese” closer to the “ethnic Chinese” side. He ex-
plained this aspect of his work in an interview with a local newspaper, emphasiz-
ing that he has always remained faithful to protecting the “tradition” of the age-
old dyes and classic motifs.
“As far as I can see, (Java’s) north coast batik has a very intimate rela-
tionship with Chinese culture (budaya China). So how could adding (Chinese 
characters) to the motifs on the material be any problem?14”
While this was his stated opinion, he was at first hesitant to express his “new 
creation” openly. This was because the element he was trying to add was some-
thing to do with “Chineseness” — generally deemed as unfit for “Indonesia’s 
individuality”. In addition, the medium he was about to add to was the surface of 
a batik — a material that represents Indonesian culture, to be precise, Javanese 
culture. However these apprehensions of his were resolved when an official en-
dorsement was conveyed — even if in casual verbal form — by the Yogyakarta 
royal court, whose members are considered to be the personification of the high-
est authority of Javanese culture. As he shifted his efforts fully into commercial 
production, he received tangible support in the form of orders for his product 
from some public institutions, and individuals who could be considered repre-
sentatives of the Muslim majority. This further added to Mr. Njoo’s confidence.
What makes this case in Lasem noteworthy, even more than the fact that an 
individual had the idea to express “Chineseness” on the surface of a fabric and 
make that thought a reality, are the results that followed: the fact that an act em-
phasizing “Chineseness” was approved of with the comment “to the contrary, it 
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is interesting and great”, and also that wide-spread and enthusiastic acceptance 
occurred on a social level.
A female Javanese purchaser who the author incidentally had the opportu-
nity to interview stated, “Lasem Batik is famous for being the batik of the Chinese 
(batik Tionghoa), you know. (Pointing to the batik of the Chinese characters) 
We need to protect these kinds of traditional values that are unique to Lasem”. 
A middle-aged ethnic Chinese man who was there by chance chimed in with a 
smile, “I can’t read them (Chinese characters), but it would look cool to be wear-
ing something like this”15.
I do not have sufficient data to argue how many and what sort of people 
these views concerning batik with Chinese characters represent16. However, the 
view expressed by the woman quoted above, as well as the description of current 
sales, “it just sells so well (laku keras)” indicates that “Chineseness” is presently 
being enthusiastically recognized as an indispensable component of “traditional 
values that are unique to Lasem”, not only by the ethnic Chinese but by others 
as well. Furthermore it is now being deemed acceptable to positively emphasize 
“Chineseness” as an attribute which enhances the value of Lasem Batik, without 
questioning to what extent the concrete expression of “Chineseness” has been 
entrenched in the local community, or to be more exact, the local ethnic Chi-
nese community.
In any case, Mr. Njoo’s “new creation” has only just begun. Born out of Mr. 
Njoo’s informal and personal experiment to see what his idea would look like 
on a batik, what now will its dissemination look like, and in what form will its ac-
ceptance come? As far as I know, most batik producers in Lasem do create batiks 
in the conventional way, utilizing tradition and creativity without attempting to 
accentuate “Chineseness” as Mr. Njoo does. So in such a context, will batiks with 
Chinese characters, “newly created” by Mr. Njoo, become ingrained as “Lasem’s 
new tradition”? Or will it generate only limited and fleeting attention?17 Even tak-
ing into account the undeniable fact that Mr. Njoo is advanced in years and does 
not have a successor, the coming developments are still a matter of great interest.
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4   A Motif for Coexistence, “Tidayu”: A Case Study in Sing-
kawang
4.1  The Unveiling of “Tidayu” Batik
It was the evening of February 27th, 2010. In a fully packed stadium in the city 
of Singkawang, West Kalimantan, then-Mayor Hasan Karman — the first ethnic 
Chinese municipal leader in this country — appeared on the central stage wear-
ing a batik shirt. Drawn on the batik with a bright red base tone was the motif of 
“Tidayu”. This was its first unveiling on a major scale.
This night was the eve of Cap Go Meh, and celebrations were being held 
while they awaited the arrival of the fifteenth day of the Chinese New Year. Since 
the fall of the Soeharto regime, a lively ceremonial procession has been held in 
Singkawang every year on Cap Go Meh. On that day, spirit mediums called “Tatung” 
adorning traditional costumes of Chinese warriors or dressed as the indigenous 
Dayak are carried around the city on portable shrines in a trance state, piercing 
themselves in the face and body with long iron needles, and biting off the wind-
pipes of live dogs and chickens18. One theory is that this festival originates from 
the practice of carrying around the channeled deities to fend off diseases and 
misfortunes. With 2010 being named the Visit West Kalimantan Year, the festival 
was being positioned as one of the highlights of the year, and the Tatung proces-
sion was being planned on an unprecedented scale. In addition to the Deputy 
Governor of the West Kalimantan Province and local military and police high 
officials, invitees of the eve celebration included some ministers from Jakarta as 
well as the Chinese Ambassador to Indonesia. Created especially for this felici-
tous occasion was the aforementioned batik with the “Tidayu” motif.
“Tidayu” is a portmanteau of “Tionghoa”, “Dayak”, and “Melayu”. According 
to Hasan Karman, who in 2007 became the first ethnic Chinese to be elected 
mayor in the nation, these three elements are the primary “sukus” that consti-
tute the city of Singkawang, and that Singkawang should strive for an identity 
in which these three elements support and grow together in harmony while 
maintaining their diversity19. It was with the objective to create an original Sing-
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kawang batik to embody this ideal represented by the word “Tidayu”, that the 
“Tidayu” batik contest was held at the end of 2009, hosted by the mayor’s wife, 
Emma20.
It is fair to say that Singkawang has not had as much accumulated history in 
batik production as Java has. This however did not stop the contest from garner-
ing almost one hundred submissions, with designs incorporating motifs repre-
senting the Tionghoa, Dayak, and Melayu. One of the important considerations in 
the evaluation process was whether the Dayak motifs used were those belonging 
to Dayaks residing in Singkawang in actuality, and not those belonging to other 
areas. Selected as the winner was a “Singkawang’s Tidayu Motif”, combining the 
undulating curves of a Dayak motif and a bamboo shoot-shaped Melayu motif 
with a Tionghoa motif of folding fans, bamboos, and clouds, all in a well-balanced 
design. By the time the 2010 Cap Go Meh had arrived, several prototypes based 
on motifs selected in this process had been completed21.
Photograph 5
The Mayor’s wife exhibits the “Tidayu” 
batik.
Photograph 6
An example of a “Tidayu” motif.
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4.2  “Chineseness” as a Component of Municipal Identity
When compared with the previous section’s case in Lasem where Mr. Njoo’s batik 
was born out of personal exploration, what most distinguishes this case in Sing-
kawang is that the design of the batik’s motif was carried out under the leader-
ship of the municipal government. How then should we understand the fact that 
an element of “Tionghoa” — which we may call “Chineseness” — is being exhibit-
ed within the brand-new concept of “Tidayu”?
In order to answer this question, we must first look back at the unique his-
tory of the ethnic Chinese in this region. Around the mid-eighteenth century, a 
large number of ethnic Chinese of Hakka descent settled in West Kalimantan to 
partake in gold mining and formed their own “republics”. Situated at the mouth 
of a river, the city of Singkawang served as the gateway to the inland frontiers, at-
tracting merchants whose settlement became key to its development. Still today, 
it is commonly understood that around half of the city’s population is ethnic 
Chinese with a Hakka majority, and that Dayak and Melayu follow in population 
size in an approximate tie22. So this is an area where, when compared to other 
areas in Indonesia, the ethnic Chinese have held an undeniable position both in 
the past and in the present. Then-Mayor Hasan Karman speaks on this topic un-
equivocally: 
“In other areas ethnic Chinese culture (budaya Tionghoa) may be un-
familiar (asing-asing), but in Singkawang it has been a part of life for hun-
dreds of years. Even though it was temporarily banned during the “New Or-
der”, it came once again to be no problem to express it in Gus Dur’s time23. 
So the ethnic Chinese culture here in our area is not something we newly 
created or manipulated.”
What is being conveyed is that in this area where ethnic Chinese have 
historically held an important position, the customary way of treating “ethnic 
Chinese culture” as if it did not exist was unnatural, not the other way around. 
However, the method of exhibiting “ethnic Chinese culture”, a method in which 
it is exhibited simultaneously with other elements under the unfamiliar concept 
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of “Tidayu”, would have to be called a new creation. Why is it that a new method 
is being employed for the expression of ethnic Chinese identity? To understand 
the answer to this question, we must closely consider the fact that this expression 
is being advocated in the context of public initiatives led by the city government 
— a development that goes beyond the ethnically Chinese mayor acting on his 
own inspiration or initiative.
It has been customary in Indonesia for the nation’s municipalities to com-
pete with one another based on their “local culture’s individuality”; competition 
which is affirmed as a factor contributing to the diversity of the “national cul-
ture”. Emphasis of such cultural expression that aims to assert the individuality 
of municipalities within their respective administrative frameworks seems to be 
increasing more than ever after the fall of the Soeharto regime, now that decen-
tralization is being facilitated as a counter-step to the legacy of centralist authori-
tarian political practices. Particularly for recently formed municipalities, such as 
Singkawang which was born in 200124, it was likely necessary to establish a new 
cultural identity to endow the administrative unit with meaning and substance, 
and to enliven it with distinctive color.
So now from this vantage point, let’s consider the cultural background of 
Singkawang: As mentioned earlier the city has had an extremely large ethnic 
Chinese presence historically, at a level that makes it stand out among other 
Indonesian areas. Even today, the ethnic Chinese account for a majority of the 
population. However, to publicly position ethnic Chinese elements as exclusively 
representing the identity of the area would be somewhat problematic. Widening 
our view to the whole of West Kalimantan, the province in which Singkawang 
City is situated, tells us why: The population ratio of the ethnic Chinese falls 
steeply to 9.45% when including the entire province — though this ratio is still 
significantly higher than the national average of 0.86%25. On the other hand the 
Dayak — who can be sub-categorized into diverse language and cultural groups 
— are far exceeded by the ethnic Chinese in population size when looking solely 
at Singkawang City, but when looking at the wider area including the hinterland 
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of Singkawang they are undoubtedly perceived as the “original residents (orang 
asli)”. Similarly, though the Melayu do not come remotely close in population 
size to the ethnic Chinese when looking only within Singkawang, there is a his-
tory of their wide dispersion along the coast of the archipelago including West 
Kalimantan. So for the Melayu too, the description “newcomer (pendatang)” is 
hardly fitting. Therefore regardless of the history of how the city was actually 
developed or its population ratio, if the ethnic Chinese — whose attributes as a 
“newcomer” or “minority (minoritas)” have been magnified for a long time in all 
parts of the nation — were to suddenly be singled out as having the status of “local 
sons (putra daerah)”, it is easy to imagine how much backlash would be generat-
ed. It was with such consideration that the concept of “Tidayu”, which exhibits 
ethnic Chinese elements simultaneously with the other two major elements, was 
born26.
This sort of expression in which “Tionghoa”, “Dayak”, and “Melayu” are treat-
ed as equal parts of a single unit can now be observed not only in the motifs of 
batiks, but in many areas in Singkawang. For example, the website of the city gov-
ernment provides an overview of the city in the following description: 
“The multi-ethnic (multi-etnis) lives of the citizens of Singkawang are 
made of the combination of the three primary ethnic groups (etnis) — 
Tionghoa / Cina, Melayu, and Dayak — as well as the other various sukus 
(suku-suku lainnya). By these groups being side by side and maintaining 
harmony, unique color is infused into the daily life of the city. The cultural 
diversity of these ethnic groups is a distinguishing and appealing charac-
teristic of Singkawang. The city offers many fascinating cultural events, de-
riving from each of these ethnic groups. These cultural events are usually 
celebrated on a large scale in accordance with religious holidays27.”
The picture that emerges from this description is a miniature version of 
Indonesia’s national motto “Unity in Diversity (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika)”, a vision 
of diverse elements maintaining their oneness while adding color with their 
individuality to the collective whole. To position the ethnic Chinese as active 
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contributors to the diversity of Singkawang would mean to redress the portray-
al of Singkawang to one that is a more “just” reflection of its reality, starting 
from aspects such as its population ratio. The post-Soeharto period is bringing 
about a growing acceptance of the status of the ethnic Chinese and their culture 
throughout the nation, but to designedly and actively depict them as an indis-
pensable part of the municipality’s identity carries a large symbolic significance 
in efforts to call for wide-ranging social participation of the ethnic Chinese who 
hold an integral place in the area. It can be expected to generate the same value 
in attracting investment from those who have attained economic success coming 
out of Singkawang28. Besides that, Singkawang’s image of possessing an “oriental 
nuance (nuansa oriental)” is becoming widely entrenched29, so for the city gov-
ernment that seeks to further energize development in the area of tourism by 
utilizing the aforementioned Cap Go Meh, there would be no logical way except 
to incorporate “Chineseness” into the city’s identity and make it a selling point.
Such is how the concept of “Tidayu” was born — through an act of cultural 
representation carried out by a municipality in the public sphere — and then 
realized on the surface of a batik. A dramatic significance can be recognized in 
the fact that “Tionghoa” was decisively incorporated in “Tidayu” as one of its com-
ponents, when seen in the context of the modern history of this nation. On the 
other hand expressing Singkawang’s identity through the concept of “Tidayu” 
may have own problems that go beyond expressing “Chineseness”. Looking to 
Indonesia’s neighbor Malaysia where governance is based on the premise that 
their nation is comprised of Malay, Chinese, and Indian citizens plainly indicates 
to us the following: To promote the fact that the three elements, “Tionghoa”, 
“Dayak” and “Melayu” maintain harmony as one entity means also to confirm the 
fact that each of these ethnic groups have a tangible presence and that they are 
conceptually separate. In addition, there is very probable risk that with each of 
the three being perceived as independent groups, the diversity that exists within 
the individual groups could be reduced, or that the presence of minority groups 
other than the primary three groups could be made invisible30 (Tsuda 2011: 258; 
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cf. Yamamoto 2006: 53, 58–59).
The Soeharto regime did not accept public mention of any antagonism 
which could threaten the unity of the nation. By ensuring that the individuality 
of a given suku was alternatively expressed as a “regional culture”, its radicaliza-
tion would be preempted. It feels slightly ironic if not precarious, that sukus are 
becoming more explicitly defined as internal components in the context of dis-
cussing the individuality of “regions”, now in the post-Soeharto period31. “Tidayu” 
— its expression seeming to symbolize the harmonious whole on the surface of a 
batik — will undoubtedly become a critical key as to whether it will be possible to 
maintain a moderate representation, preventing the separation of components 
from leading to radicalization.
5  An Acceptable Cultural Representation of “Chineseness”
5.1  Moderate Discourse That Doesn’t “Cross the Line”
Though the case in Lasem in Section 3 and the case in Singkawang in Section 
4 are both examples of undertakings in the post-Soeharto period in which the 
expression of “Chineseness” on the surface of batiks is being attempted, the two 
cases contrast in several ways. The most substantial difference would probably 
be the fact that the former had been started by an individual who simply had an 
idea he casually tried out, neither intending some sort of political message nor 
a large-scale campaign, whereas the latter had been planned as part of larger 
efforts of a municipality towards creating its identity. Another difference is that 
in Lasem a “tradition” of batik which had earned a relatively solid reputation had 
already been in existence — one even known as “batik of the ethnic Chinese”— 
and as if to add a new layer on to what was already there, a further declaration of 
“Chineseness” was being attempted. Whereas in Singkawang, batik was newly cre-
ated in an environment where a “tradition” was almost nonexistent, with “Chi-
neseness” positioned as a single element within the diversity being expressed on 
the surface of the batik.
The undertakings currently in process on the surface of batiks in these two 
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locations may count as no more than one insignificant page within the volume 
of monumental changes, when viewed in the larger picture of the modern his-
tory of batik we saw back in Section 1 of this chapter. However, that there is great 
relevance in the fact that the newly incorporated element was “Chineseness” in 
both cases is undeniable — undeniable because this was an element which had 
been assigned a negative value indifferent to the will of the ethnic Chinese, an 
element whose expression had been forbidden, and an element which the eth-
nic Chinese themselves had hidden away through self-imposed control for more 
than thirty years during the Soeharto era. The fact that expression of “Chinese-
ness” is now occurring cannot be discussed without mentioning the transitions 
in the national socio-political environments which accompanied the regime 
change, outlined in Section 2.
It was clear however in both case studies, that the regime change bringing 
about more freedom in the atmosphere, does not in any way mean that open-
ly exhibiting one’s long-suppressed “Chineseness” is now fully accepted; the 
presence of a certain level of hesitation and care could be observed among the 
individuals involved in the two cases. This could be plainly observed in Lasem 
through the fact that approval from members of the Javanese royal court was 
sought, and in Singkawang through the fact that the expression of “Chineseness” 
was part of an expression of diversity which involved other major ethnic groups 
as well.
The historian Arief Budiman indicates that, while expressions of “Chinese-
ness” or expression as ethnic Chinese has become observable since the nation 
entered the post-Soeharto period, a considerable number of ethnic Chinese live 
with a sense of fear that if they were to assert their “Chineseness” too much the 
sympathy they are now receiving from the Pribumis could turn into backlash (Bu-
diman 2005: 100). He observes that the “line not to cross” signifying how far they 
can go in asserting “Chineseness” is unclear, which adds to this hesitation.
The ban on asserting “Chineseness” has in fact been lifted. However, there 
is no doubt that ample consideration toward the Pribumi becomes indispensible 
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in its expression. Especially if the expression is of a more public nature, it seems 
what is demanded is to assert the individuality of “Chineseness” in a way condu-
cive to coexistence with other groups, and only so long as it can contribute to 
the diversity of Indonesia. These types of restrictions in terms of expression are 
not demands posed solely on the ethnic Chinese. However, reflecting on how 
the ethnic Chinese were continuously questioned about their allegience toward 
Indonesia in modern history, it seems inevitable that the ethnic Chinese would 
become particularly conscious about choosing a way of expression that stresses 
“Chineseness” without conflicting with “being Indonesian”, a way of expression 
that is moderate — in other words that doesn’t “cross the line”.
5.2  Batik as a Medium for Expression
At this point, batik’s special characteristic as a medium of expression as conveyed 
in the case studies in this chapter should be becoming clear. It should be espe-
cially understood when considering why in Singkawang, where the batik indus-
try cannot be said to have set root historically, that batik was specifically chosen 
when looking for a medium which could symbolically embody the municipality’s 
identity.
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, batik has without doubt 
come to be perceived as the “essence of Indonesian culture”. Therefore using ba-
tik — or batik-like material — to create expressions unique to a given locality can 
help promote the fact that the area has a “culture” no less worthy of pride than 
any other. In the political context of the post-Soeharto period in which munic-
ipalities vigorously compete with one another to offer more individuality, for a 
newly established municipality to possess its own batik (pattern) carries consider-
able meaning32. Batik today has become an effective medium for these localities 
to express their cultural individuality.
Since batik is a fabric, practically speaking it would be possible to incorpo-
rate any pattern or motif desired. The “batik unique to the region” thus complet-
ed would be deemed a manifestation of the “essence of Indonesian culture”, no 
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matter how uniquely different it may be, so long as it does not vastly depart from 
the commonly accepted definition of batik — being printed material, instead of 
using traditional wax-resist dying method, apparently does not pose a problem 
in garnering this acceptance. To restate this idea, if a particular element — for 
example the element of “Tionghoa” — was to be incorporated onto the surface of 
a batik in a real-case scenario, it would be possible to assert that the very element 
had attained a position as a part of the diversity contributing to the “oneness 
of Indonesia”. As is quite apparent, this logic structure overlaps with the signifi-
cance of the fact that a pavilion named “Indonesian Chinese Cultural Park (Ta-
man Budaya Tionghoa Indonesia / 印華文化公園 )” is being constructed on the 
premises of the Taman Mini33, where the best of Indonesian regional cultures are 
assembled (Kitamura 2007). Batik has come to have a function extremely similar 
to Taman Mini, which certifies everything it contains as “belonging to Indonesia”.
Batik is utilized in contemporary fashion as well, and has a side that con-
trasts its “traditional qualities”, allowing for unrestricted freedom in modifica-
tion and arrangement. All sorts of expressions by all types of designers are being 
incorporated into batiks on a daily basis. However it is only through the following 
two functions which at some point in time became components of batik — its 
function as a medium enabling the expression of diverse identities of many re-
gions, as well as its function to inscribe a guarantee that, in spite of such diversi-
ty, a given expression is yet still one “belonging to Indonesia” — that we can un-
derstand for the first time what really occurred in both case studies. That is, the 
fact that the city of Singkawang selected batik as their vehicle for creating a new 
identity for their municipality and didn’t encounter backlash from any direc-
tion even when incorporating the expression of “Chineseness”, and the fact that 
Lasem’s batik with Chinese characters was initiated as a personal “new creation” 
yet in an unexpected turn is beginning to receive wide acceptance and appre-
ciation, transcending barriers and attracting buyers beyond the ethnic Chinese 
demographic.
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5.3  What the Expression of “Chineseness” Contains
Now more than a decade after the fall of the Soeharto regime, the cultural ex-
pression of “Chineseness” is no longer deemed to be that much of a problem, 
so long as it is being expressed as “an inseparable part of Indonesia”. This holds 
true whether the expression restates and boldly emphasizes “Chineseness”, or 
explicitly indicates its presence as a component of the municipality’s identity. 
Nevertheless, in neither of the two cases studied in this chapter, was “Chineseness” 
one day suddenly asserted where there had been nothing before. In Lasem, the 
existence of “batik of the ethnic Chinese” had already been widely known. In 
Singkawang also — even though the city didn’t possess any accumulated histo-
ry of batik production which could be spoken of — the presence of the ethnic 
Chincese both historically and socially was overwhelmingly strong. It is only 
with these foundations having already been in place that an expression of “Chi-
neseness” as an important component of the “tradition” and “culture” in these 
areas — though they would not assert their areas to be “homelands of the ethnic 
Chinenese” — has gained wide local acceptance, whether personally or publicly.
Before I end this chapter, I will add an analysis on what the substance of this 
“Chineseness”, moderately expressed, was actually made of.
The elements of “Chineseness” dyed on the surface of the batik were Chi-
nese characters in the case of Lasem, and in Singkawang were motifs such as the 
folding fan, bamboo, and the cloud. There is no question that Chinese char-
acters are a tangible symbol of “Chineseness” — maybe “evocative of China” is 
a more appropriate way to describe it — no matter who were to look at it. The 
folding fan and the bamboo too are motifs that easily trigger similar images. The 
pattern of the cloud as well, is reminiscent of a pattern already known in a differ-
ent area (Mega Mendung) as a representative motif associated with “Chineseness”.
However, what warrants attention here is that Chinese characters were no 
longer a part of everyday life among the ethnic Chinese living in Lasem. In Sing-
kawang also, there is no sign that the “Tionghoa” motif chosen was examined — 
to the same degree that the “Dayak” motif was carefully considered to ensure that 
258
Koji TSUDA
it was actually from Singkawang — to ensure that it was an ingrained part of the 
lives of the ethnic Chinese in Singkawang. So the expressions which were chosen 
in these two cases could not, without considerable reservation, be described as 
elements which had been fostered within the ethnic Chinese communities in the 
respective localities.
I have pointed out in a separate article that this expression of “Chinese 
culture” in the post-Soeharto period, manifest in a mood of celebration of what 
could be described as an “ethnic Chinese cultural renaissance” — like the lion 
dance, the red lantern, and Mandarin gown for example — tends to fall into 
the pattern of expressions packaged for easy consumption of something typical-
ly “evocative of China”, but not “evocative of the ethnic Chinese” (Tsuda 2011: 
229–231). This type of indexical culture is now beginning to be distributed and 
consumed widely in demographics extending beyond the ethnic Chinese, simply 
because it somehow feels cool and pop34. However as revealed also in the case 
studies in this chapter, these indexical cultures that are “evocative of China” have 
been adopted and appropriated as elements in the context of articulating “locally 
fostered ethnic Chinese tradition” and “ethnic Chinese culture deeply rooted in 
the area”.
What inevitably gets overseen when such elements that stress indexical dis-
tinctness receive attention, are things which are difficult to visualize or package, 
or something which has become so much a part of the lives of the people that it 
can no longer be objectified. The fact that the objects which a “culture” signifies 
are often removed from something intimate with everyday life and have the ten-
dency to be limited to superficial indexical elements can also be observed in oth-
er “suku cultures” and “regional cultures”35, which may imply that there is noth-
ing unusual about this in the context of cultural representation in present-day 
Indonesia. Is this merely a legacy of how representation pertaining to “suku / 
regional cultures” was established during the Soeharto era? Or does it indicate 
that a substantial homogenization — or “Indonesianization” — has progressed 
so far in the domains of daily life that people no longer have a way to display to 
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each other their individualities and differences stemming from where they are 
from or where they live, without emphasizing indexical elements? I do not yet 
have the answer to this question.
What is clear though, is that the ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia have 
consciously objectified their “own culture” throughout the twentieth century, 
and have been forced to do so. They experienced an era of rapid awakening to 
their “own culture” through an era in which the expression of these cultures 
was completely banned, and an era in which the expression once again became 
acceptable. At each phase — as if mirroring the changes of terms describing 
them — the substance of the “Chineseness” which they were supposed to have, 
its meaning, and its very value kept being questioned. Now in the post-Soeharto 
period, they no longer have to deal with finger-pointing and being called “Cina”, 
and can stand proud when they speak of themselves as “Tionghoa” — or “Chinese”. 
As for the substance of the “Tionghoa / Chinese” culture, which for the ethnic 
Chinese means the very thing that should be asserted and carried with pride, it 
appears that they are still in the middle of its exploration.
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Notes
 1 Cited from UNESCO’s website (http: //www.unesco.org/culture/ich/RL/00170).
 2 According to Sekimoto (1995: 42), the views that batik is a product of elaborate 
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handiwork rooted in a unique tradition handed down for generations and that it 
must be protected and preserved were shared by many Dutch and Javanese elites 
living in the East Indies from around the turn of the twentieth century. However it 
is said that it wasn’t until the 1980s and later, that the concept of batik as a cultural 
commodity rather than an industrial commodity started to become widespread 
and mainstream in Indonesia.
 3 Hokkien readings of “中華” and “中国” becoming widespread was probably not un-
related to the fact that a large number of Peranakan Chinse who were a majority in 
Java were Hokkien, and that the center of distribution of print media was also in 
Java.
 4 As a follow-up to the decision made in this seminar (Seminar AD ke-II/1966), a year 
later in 1967 an official notice (Surat Edaran Presidium Kabinet Ampera tentang Ma sa-
lah Tjina No.SE-06/Pres.Kab/6/67) was released.
 5 As a general rule, it is the bloodline principle (jus sanguinis) applied to one’s fa-
ther’s lineage that determines if one is legally “Cina” or not. This principle was ap-
plied irrespective of whether the person was from a family which had been in In-
donesia for several generations, and regardless of how strongly the person might 
feel his or her identity as belonging to Indonesia.
 6 Under the Soeharto regime, the tendency to stress the “otherness” of the “ethnic 
Chinese”, along with “the West”, “communism”, and “Islam fundamentalism” 
further accelerated (Heryanto 1998: 97). Placing “under erasure” in this context 
analogously refers to a condition in which the word “Chineseness” is crossed out 
and denied (erased), yet that very act has the effect of making the characters writ-
ten under the x-mark stand out, drawing more attention to them.
 7 According to the year 2000 census, there are 3,078 ethnic Chinese — listed un-
der the category “Cina (WNI)” — living in Rembang Regency (0.55% of the total 
population), of which a majority live in the capital of the regency, the Rembang 
District, and the Lasem District.
 8 There were approximately 120 households running batik businesses in the town of 
Lasem in 1929, and all of these are described to have been ethnic Chinese house-
holds (Kwan et.al 2010: 37). Recently Javanese-run batik production studios have 
been established in the town of Lasem (Suyatna et al. 2010: 74–78).
 9 The descriptions in the passages below are based on interviews conducted on Feb-
ruary 23rd, 2010 and April 29th, 2011 at Mr. Njoo Tjoen Hian’s production studio.
 10 Since the early 2000s the batik industry in Lasem was on the whole entering a time 
of revival, partly owing to support from the local regency government. However at 
Mr. Njoo’s production studio, both output and sales had sharply declined due to 
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his seasoned craftswomen being headhunted by an entrepreneur who had newly 
entered the market. It was during this time that one day he would pick up a pencil 
and put down his design on a white cloth without much thought, and this was how 
his batik with Chinese characters was born.
 11 Mr. Njoo considers ancestor worship important, and calls himself a devout believ-
er of the Teachings of Confucius (Confucianism). However during the Soeharto 
era, he could not write “Confucian (Agama Konghucu)” in the religion field of his 
resident registration certificate (KTP), so he wrote “Buddhist” for expedience. 
Confucianism came to be (re)instated as an officially approved religion in Indone-
sia from around 2006.
 12 The Sultan of Yogyakarta and his family come from the lineage of the Sultanate 
of Mataram which was established at the end of the sixteenth century. The family 
is widely revered and adored to this day as protectors of the heart of Javanese cul-
ture. After Indonesia’s independence, the additional role of governor of the Spe-
cial Region of Yogyakarta has been passed down through hereditary succession. 
The visitor on this day was GBPH Chakradiningrat, who is the half-brother of the 
current Sultan, Hamengkubuwana X.
 13 Haji is a term of respect for a man who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca, the 
holy city of Islam. A man referred to as a Haji in this context, could normally be 
assumed to be a devout Javanese Muslim.
 14 Article published in Suara Merdeka on February 12th, 2010: “Para Penjaga Budaya 
Tionghoa (1): Lestarikan Tradisi Lewat Inovasi Batik Kaligrafi”.
 15 Both quotes are from conversations which occurred in February 23rd, 2010, at Mr. 
Njoo Tjoen Hian’s production studio.
 16 Commodities produced at Mr. Njoo’s production studio are in some cases ordered 
and purchased by individuals directly, but in other cases are bought by wholesal-
ers. Therefore Mr. Njoo himself is unable to assess what kind of people these batiks 
reach at their final destination.
 17 These batiks with Chinese characters are priced at thirty thousand rupiahs a piece 
(approximately 35 US dollars as of 2010–11 exchange rates), which is relatively 
reasonable for a hand-drawn batik. By end April 2011, two years after launching 
production, 375 had been sold. Interestingly enough, at the time of the author’s 
visit to Lasem in August 2014, a few Javanese-owned batik producing studios were 
producing the batiks with Chines characters, quite similar to those of Njoo’s.
 18 In Singkawang’s Cap Go Meh festival, those acting as Tatungs are not necessarily of 
ethnic Chinese background; the deities being channeled include those of Dayak 
and Melayu origin as well. This is why the 2010 Cap Go Meh festival official tourists’ 
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brochure promotes the fact that Singkawang’s Cap Go Meh is not merely a tradi-
tional ethnic Chinese cultural event but a unique event in which the “influence 
and fusion of local cultures” can be witnessed.
 19 According to Matsumura (2013: 139–140), Hasan Karman explained that the 
concept of “Tidayu” was inspired by that of “Cidayu” — an abbreviation of “Cina”, 
“Dayak” and “Melayu” — initially advocated in Pontianak, the capital city of the 
West Kalimantan Province, in the early 2000s, though the latter scheme failed to 
become popular. The concept of “Tidayu” was launched publicly at a Koran recit-
ing contest (musabaqah tilawatil Quran) in 2008, where a dance consisting of the 
three ethnic-group elements was performed under the name of “Tidayu Dance 
(Tarian Tidayu)” for the first time. The subsequent account is based on an inter-
view of the mayor of Singkawang and his wife, which took place on February 28th, 
2010 at the mayor’s official residence.
 20 The mayor’s wife doubles as the Singkawang Branch Director of the National 
Crafts Council of Indonesia (Dewan Kerajinan Nasional), which sponsored this con-
test. The National Crafts Council of Indonesia is a not-for-profit government-affil-
iated organization established in 1980 for the purpose of protecting cultures and 
raising awareness. The organization has branch offices in each of the provinces, 
which have subordinate offices in each regency and city. The top official in the 
central administration is the nation’s first lady and it is stipulated that each branch 
office is to be headed by the wife of the municipal leader.
 21 It should be noted that these were not batiks in the strict sense, as they were not 
made using the wax-resist method but rather were printed material produced at a 
factory in Jakarta. See also note 32.
 22 Note that according to the year 2000 census, the number of ethnic Chinese in the 
three districts in Bengkayang Regency – which would go on to form Singkawang 
City – was 63,246, accounting for 41.71% of the total. The numbers of ethnic Chi-
nese with mainland Chinese or Taiwanese citizenship were 822 and 54 respectively. 
Among the groups classifiable as Melayu (Malay), the largest group is the “Sambas” 
(7.98%) while groups whose suku names listed in the survey categories include 
the word “Melayu” (there are 22 such groups including “Melayu Pontianak”) make 
only 1.84% of the total. The groups with numbers which stand out more are those 
whose origins are outside the island (though most of them were born in West Kali-
mantan) such as the “Jawa” (7.43%) and the “Madura” (5.29%). When looking at 
groups which could be considered to be Dayak, the very few groups with a relative-
ly substantial population size included the “Darat” (5.22%) and the “Kendayan / 
Kenayan” (1.88%). Even combining the numbers of all other groups did not come 
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remotely close to the size of the Dayak population generally believed to exist. This 
may be explained by the number of “Samin” (19.99%), who are given an individ-
ual category in the survey as a suku of Java. It can be speculated that most Dayak, 
instead of being counted as such, were grouped together in the same survey cate-
gory as “Samin”.
 23 Referring to the years of Indonesia’s fourth president, Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
leadership (1999–2001). During his administration, laws which had come to sym-
bolize the oppression of ethnic Chinese culture were abolished.
 24 Singkawang was designated as the capital of Sambas Regency in 1959, but in 1999 
when Bengkayang Regency separated from Sambas Regency, the former capital 
was incorporated into one of the districts of the new-born regency. Later in 2001, 
Singkawang became independent from Bengkayang Regency, and was established 
as a city (kota), upgrading its status to that equivalent to a regency.
 25 Both figures are based on the year 2000 census. Note however that the ethnic 
Chinese population which was revealed in this census was far lower than most esti-
mates.
 26 “Tidayu” should be understood as a concept in which the ethnic Chinese are 
brought into the group which previously consisted of the Dayak and the Melayu, 
who had been perceived as the undisputed “local sons” in the entire West Kali-
mantan area. Note also that many of the ethnic Chinese living in Singkawang are 
of Hakka descent, but when expanding focus to the entire West Kalimantan re-
gion, many parts have other ethnic Chinese communities, such as those of Teochew 
(Chaozhou) descent. Diversity is very noticeable also within the Dayak and the 
Melayu ethnic groups, and the fact that subdivisions within these groups are delib-
erately not underscored is noteworthy.
  On a related note, in the year 2000 census the Dayak group had been broken 
down into its subdivisions in the survey, which prevented the group from being 
ranked as one of the major ethnic groups of West Kalimantan. There were some 
voices of protest raised by Dayak intellectuals of the opinion that the government 
deliberately attempted to downgrade their position to minority status.
 27 Cited from “Selayang Pandang” section in Singkawang City Government Website 
(http: //singkawangkota.go.id/spektakuler2012/index.php/profil-kota.html).
 28 The ethnic Chinese in Singkawang often leave the area as migrant workers seek-
ing economic opportunities. In 2006, an association for such migrants from Sing-
kawang and the neighboring area was formed with a primary membership of the 
ethnic Chinese living in Jakarta. Hasan Karman was the vice president of this asso-
ciation (Perhimpunan Masyarakat Singkawang dan Sekitarnya / 山口洋地區郷親會) 
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until he won the 2007 mayoral election.
  It is also well known that there are many cases of ethnic Chinese women in Sing-
kawang and the neighboring area leaving to marry men in other places such as 
Taiwan, seeking economic betterment.
 29 In Indonesia, the term “oriental” seems to be used to describe things containing 
elements reminiscent of China and its general area, in addition to — or actually 
more so than — the image of the Middle and Near East.
 30 Note that the “Melayu”, listed as one of the three primary elements, is defined in 
the narrow sense as the people who live in areas including the eastern coast of 
Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula and the coastal areas of Kalimantan who speak the 
Malay language. The website quoted above is most likely using the term “Melayu” 
according to this narrow definition. However, this concept of “Melayu” could be 
expanded to be inclusive of the “Malay group”, referring to the so-called Austro-
nesian-speaking peoples including the Javanese and the Madurese among oth-
ers. How the intended range of the term “Melayu” will come to be defined in its 
use will be dependent on the interpretation of the term by the city government 
and individual parties concerned. At present there appears to be a tendency for 
groups like the Madurese who brought about land conflict with local residents in 
the late 1990s — with the Dayak and the Melayu — not to be represented as bear-
ers of the local culture, being instead deemed as “newcomers (pendatang)” who 
don’t respect local culture and customs (Hui 2007: 301–302).
 31 Since the policy of regional autonomy was adopted in 1999, I have begun to fre-
quently hear one’s “authenticity (asli)” within a given locality being wielded as a 
basis for arguing for preferential treatment in claiming various rights. Even while 
instances of the differentiation of “pribumi/ non-pribumi” — used at the national 
level to exclude primarily the ethnic Chinese — being heard in public places are 
decreasing, the labeling of a person as a “local son (putera daerah)” to indicate that 
a person is a native of a respective area, seems to be gaining increasing acceptance 
in regional politics. It can be argued that the fact that it is now possible in Sing-
kawang for the ethnic Chinese to be positioned as an element within the “local 
son” concept is a reflection of changes taking place in the frameworks of such dis-
crimination / differentiation.
 32 These movements of different localities attempting to create their own unique 
batiks are not necessarily new phenomena arising for the first time in the post-Soe-
harto period. Even during the Soeharto era western shirts made of batik — often 
incorporating motifs of the given area — were being adopted as secondary uni-
forms of officials and teachers. Recently, municipality-led initiatives have been 
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seen to obtain patents on representative motifs of batiks of each region.
 33 The national cultural park, established in 1974 in south Jakarta with the personal 
backing of the wife of President Soeharto. Its formal name is “Taman Mini Indone-
sia Indah (The Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park)”. On the wide park grounds 
traditional houses representing all of the Indonesian provinces are exhibited. 
Folk art from respective provinces is displayed and sold inside the houses. The 
design of the pavilion representing the West Kalimantan Province incorporates as 
primary motifs the Malay Sultan’s palace (Istana Kadriah) located in the province 
capital, as well as a Dayak long house; currently it does not include any major-scale 
expression of ethnic Chinese elements.
 34 In contemporary consumer society where all types of things are consumed as sym-
bols of distinctness, it is not unusual at all in Indonesia or elsewhere to witness the 
phenomena of T-shirts and stickers with alphabet or hiragana characters strung 
together forming lines with no intelligible meaning, being consumed simply as a 
design. Chinese characters and their unique designs are no exception. Of course 
it is not that Chinese characters, when being accepted as interesting designs, are 
necessarily being associated with the actual ethnic Chinese people or China.
 35 The process batik underwent in the twentieth century until being considered a 
cultural heritage could be restated as a process in which it became removed from 
daily life and objectified.
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